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ኢትዮጵያ ውስጥ ከቅርብ ጊዚያት ወዲህ የዋጋ ግሽበት ከፍተኛ ችግር አየሆነ 
መጥቷል። አንደመፍትሄ መንግስት የተለያዩ የገበያ ዋጋን የማረጋጋት ስራዋችን 
ቢሰራም ለችግሩ መፍትሄ ሊሆኑ አልቻሉም። በአብዛኛው ሸማቾችና የመንግስት 
አካላት ለዚህ ዋነኛ ተጠያቂ የሚያደርጉት የነጋዴዎች ዋጋን አለአግባብ መጨመርና 
ዋጋ ሲቀንስ ደግሞ በፍጥነትና ወይም ሙሉ በሙሉ አለመቀነስ ነው። የዚህ ጥናት 
አላማ የነጋዴዎችን የገበያ ዋጋ ሲጨምርና ሲቀንስ፣ የሽያጭ ዋጋው አተማመን ምን 
ይመስላል የሚለውን ለማጥናት ነው። ጥናቱ የተከናዋነው በአስራ አምስት የበቆሎ 
ገበያዎች የተሰበሰበውን የመግዥና መሸጫ ዋጋ በመጠቀም ነው። የጥናቱ ግኝት 
እንደሚያመለክተዉ የነጋዴዎች ዋጋ ከማህል አገር (አዲስ አበባ) ሲጨምር 
አምብዛም የበቆሎ የሽያጭ ዋጋ አይጨምርም። አንዳውም በአንዳንድ የበቆሎ 
ገበያዎች (ነቀምትና መቀሌ) ነጋዴዎች የመሸጫ ዋጋ ከአዲስ አበባ ሲቀንስ እነዚህ 
የበቆሎ ገበያዎች ግን በፍጥነት የበቆሎ የመሽጫ ዋጋን ሲቀንሱ ታይተዋል። 
በአጠቃላይ ጥናቱ አንደሚያሳየው ከሆነ ነጋዴዎችን  ለዋጋ ግሽበቱ መሉ ለሙሉ 
ተጠያቂ ማድረግ ትክክል አንዳልሆነ ያሳያል። ነገር ግን መንግስት ዋጋን ለማረጋጋት 
የሚወስዳቸው ርምጃዎች ወጥና ግልጽ መሆን አለባቸው። በተለይ መንግስት የዋጋን 
ግሽበት የማረጋጋት ስራ በግልጽ በህግ የታገዘና የገበያ ተዋናዮችን ፍላጎት አካታች 
አንዲሆን ይህ ጥናት ያስገነዝባል፡፡   
Abstract  
 
In this study, we investigated the presence of predatory price adjustment practices in 
the grain market in Ethiopia by relying on data during the post-agricultural market 
liberalization period from July 2004 to March 2016. We employed an Asymmetric 
Error Correction (AECM) model to test the presence of Asymmetric Price 
Transmission (APT) between integrated wholesale regional maize markets. The 
results demonstrate that out of 14 regional maize market pairs with the central Addis 
Ababa maize market, APT is confirmed in only two regional wholesale maize markets 
of Mek’ele and Nekemete. Hence, the widely held belief by consumers and 
government that traders’ inappropriate price adjustment contributes to the 
persistence of soaring food prices in Ethiopia is just a misconception. It is argued in 
this study that the recent surge in maize price in Ethiopia has little to do with APT in 
maize market.  
Keywords: Asymmetry; Cointegration; Food price surge; Maize market; 
Smallholder 




Since 2003, grain markets in Ethiopia have been experiencing unprecedented price 
spikes. Commodity prices have shot-up and the growth rate in food price inflation 
has been much higher than the world standard. An interesting follow-up question 
is, therefore, what explains Ethiopia’s soaring food price? To answer this, the first 
step is to isolate the possible market-related causes of soaring food prices. There 
are two potential candidates for this: (1) price shock diffusion from international 
markets and (2) domestic supply and demand dynamics.  
 
Policy makers and consumers have consistently blamed private sectors, especially 
grain traders for unfair price fixing and market allocation in the food market in 
Ethiopia since 2008. This is because policy makers and consumers have 
overlooked the important role of traders in providing marketing service to 
smallholder farmers, and their contribution to grain price stabilization. 
Resultantly, price fixing and market allocation became an important policy issue, 
with the pricing practices in the food market called into question by the Ethiopian 
government in 2011. This resulted in a new policy in food market regulation, and 
direct government intervention in commercial grain import and distribution at 
subsidized price for consumers and flourmill factories. In an effort to control 
unfair pricing, in 2011, the Ethiopian government imposed price caps on 17 basic 
food items. However, this intervention worsened the problem as it caused a 
reduction in availability of some food items in the market. Due to that, the 
government reversed the price cap decision for most crops in June 2011 (Minten 
et al., 2012). In this article, we challenge the widely held perception that traders’ 
inappropriate price adjustment contributes to the persistence of soaring food prices 
in Ethiopia by taking the case of maize commodity through market integration and 
price transmission study.  
 
The rest of this article is structured as follows. Section two describes the market-
related causes of soaring grain prices. Section three presents the specification of 
econometric models used in this study. Section four discusses findings of the 
study. The last section concludes.  
 
Market-related causes of high food prices  
Figure 1 below is schematic diagram demonstrating the possible market-related 
causes of high domestic grain prices. Suppose there is market integration between 
international and domestic grain markets. Owing to the assumption of ‘small-
economy’, price signals direction are expected to be unidirectional, running from 




world to the domestic grain market. Overall, openness in trade and allowing 
international arbitrage involvement increase market integration between domestic 
and world markets. There are different factors that can speed-up or impede the 
transmission of price shocks from international to domestic grain markets. These 
include: (1) Tradability of a commodity: Transmission from world to domestic 
grain markets occurs when a commodity is traded on international markets. The 
price for a non-tradable commodity is influenced by domestic supply and demand 
dynamics and government policies.  
 
(2) Commodity trade regimes: the other factor comprises trade position or trade 
regimes where domestic commodity price formation depends on these. Depending 
on a country’s production potential and consumption pattern, domestic commodity 
price formation depends on either of the three trade regimes: autarky, Import 
Parity Price (IPP), or Export Parity Price (EPP). If a country is a net importer of a 
commodity, then domestic price formation depends on IPP. In this case, domestic 
prices should then be a function of world prices, exchange rate, transportation 
costs, and possible import tax (Meyer et al. 2006). In an IPP trade regime, one 
would expect a high degree of price transmission from world to domestic grain 
markets. On the other hand, if a country is a net exporter of a commodity, then the 
trade regime switches to EPP. Under such conditions, the extent of transmission of 
price shocks from world to domestic markets becomes high. When a country 
reaches a self-sufficient position, domestic price formation will lie within the price 
band of IPP and EPP. In the autarky trade regime, aside from government policies, 
domestic prices are determined by the interaction of domestic supply and demand 
conditions and are unrelated to international price shocks. 
 
 
(3) Trade policy: government trade policies also influence price shock 
transmission from international to domestic grain markets. In most cases, the 
implicit motive of government policy instruments is to either block or reduce the 
pass-through of price signals from international to domestic markets. For instance, 
policies like foreign exchange rationing impede the participation of traders on the 
international grain market. Even if imports become profitable, traders will not 
freely become involved in international grain trade to exploit profitable import 
opportunities. As a result, domestic prices for tradable commodity will drift over 
the upper threshold IPP. This will have direct implications on the domestic prices 
of tradable commodities and consumer welfare. 
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In general, high price shock diffusion from international to domestic markets will 
influence domestic prices of a tradable commodity. Through substitution effects, 
this will in turn influence prices of non-tradable commodities in domestic markets. 
The combined effect will raise food price inflation. In fact, this depends on the 
weight of a commodity in a consumer basket. In a developing country setting, 
expenditure for food constitutes the largest weight in the consumer basket. Soaring 
prices in the food market will therefore translate into high food price inflation. 
 
 
When a country is in a self-sufficient position, domestic demand and supply 
dynamics determine price formation and instability of a commodity. Some of the 
factors that might lead to price instability in domestic grain markets include 
rainfall fluctuation, production stagnation, and population growth. Of particular 
interest to us is the type of market structure that characterizes the grain industry 
(performance of grain markets). If the grain market is characterized by high 
market power, then middlemen will dominate the pricing of a commodity. In this 
case, traders tend to react quickly to adjust to high price shocks. However, they 
will become reluctant to pass-through price reductions to end-users. This kind of 
domination in the grain market structure could create price stickiness (what goes 
up does not come down), which benefits only middlemen at the expense of 
producers and end-users. Thus, further disrupting government agricultural policies 







































Figure 1. Conceptual framework for understanding soaring domestic grain prices instability 
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Asymmetric Error Correction Model (AECM) 
Here, we are primarily concerned in testing the price adjustment response of 
regional maize markets to positive and negative price deviations from previous 
year disequilibria. To analyse this, we have relaxed the standard two-step Engle 
and Granger (1987) cointegration model by decomposing the error correction term 
into positive and negative components. Earlier studies on asymmetric price 
transmissions (APT) applied the Wolffram–Houck (W-H) (Wolffram, 1971; 
Houck, 1977) method to investigate the short-run and long-run asymmetric price 
transmissions. The W–H method for the response of market price   
  to changes in  
  
 
 market price is specified as follows: 
 
∑     
  
          
  ∑       
  
      
  ∑       
  
                        (1)                                 
where 
        for all     , and 0 otherwise  
        for all     , and 0 otherwise; 
       the first difference of the price on market   at time  ,   ,  
 and    are 
coefficients and   is the current time period.  
 
Detection of asymmetry is through testing whether        . Short-run and long-
run asymmetry can be tested by introducing lag terms in ∑     
  and ∑      
  into 
Equation (1) above. According to von Cramon-Taubadel (1998), the W–H 
specification suffers from first-order serial correlation, which is often indicative of 
spurious regression. The presence of spurious regression is corrected if the 
analysed variables are cointegrated. In his analysis on vertical APT in the German 
pork market, von Cramon-Taubadel (1998) has shown that the above W–H 
specification is inconsistent with cointegration.
1
 In response, the author has 
proposed the use of Asymmetric Error Correction Model (AECM) for cointegrated 
variables. This approach combines cointegration and asymmetry based on the 
assumption that   
  and    
 
 are linked by a unique long-run relation, while the 
contemporaneous and short-run dynamics that correct departures from equilibrium 
relation are asymmetric (von Cramon-Taubadel and Fahlbusch, 1997).  
 
In this study, the von Cramon-Taubadel (1998) approach is adopted to test for 
asymmetry in price adjustment. The AECM is outlined in Equation (2) below and 
                                                          
1    See Von Cramon-Taubadel and Loy (1996) and von Cramon-Taubadel (1998) for detailed explanation on 
how re-parameterisation of the W-H specification in Equation (4.4) is incompatible with cointegration.  




it is obtained by decomposing the lagged error correction term  obtained from the 
two-stage Engle and Granger (1987) cointegration approach into its positive 
(      
 )
 
and negative parts (      
 ). Splitting the error correction term
2
 into 
positive and negative parts would enable us to observe whether the speed of price 
adjustment of regional wholesale maize markets to upward and downward price 
deviations from the equilibrium position are different. In other words, whether 
price transmission is asymmetric.  
   
       ∑      
          
 
    ∑       
 
   
    
        
    
        
 
   
         
where     =       
        
 . An F-test can be used to test the null hypothesis 
of symmetric price adjustment (  
  =   
 ).  
 
Results and Discussion 
 
 Maize price leadership   
The extended VAR procedure of the Toda and Yamamoto (1995) causality test 
analyses the lead-lag price relationships among regional wholesale maize markets. 
The central market hypothesis test was conducted in two stages. Firstly, the 
wholesale maize market price relationship between Addis Ababa and major 
surplus maize markets is examined. Secondly, the deficit maize markets and the 
leadership role of the Addis Ababa maize market price are investigated. The 
classification of markets as deficit and surplus maize markets is based on the 
USAID maize production and market flow map.  
 
Before commencing the estimation of the T-Y causality test, one must identify the 
maximum order of integration of the underlying variables as well as the optimal 
lag length of the VAR system. To address this, Dickey and Fuller (1979) proposed 
                                                          
2    It is also possible to segment the contemporaneous term of the right-hand side of the equation of the central 
maize market     
 
 into positive and negative parts to test for asymmetric contemporaneous adjustment. 
This type of asymmetry is considered in Chapter 6. For a detailed explanation on the different means of 
introducing asymmetry into the Error Correction Regression, see von Cramon-Taubadel and Loy (1996).  
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a test to detect the non-stationarity of series using the ADF test. Table 1 below 
depicts the results of unit root tests based on ADF, ERS, and KPSS statistics in 
levels and first difference of the variables. The results suggest that all variables are 
nonstationary in levels while they turn stationary in first difference. Therefore, the 
maximum order of integration should be equal to one.  
Table 1. Unit root tests3 
 ADF ERS KPSS 
Level (constant, no trend)                                                Test statistics        
Addis Ababa  -1.63 -0.55 0.95***  
Ambo -1.82 -0.76 0.93*** 
Bahir Dar   -1.53 -0.62 0.91*** 
Debre-Birhan  -1.53 -0.40 0.96*** 
Debre-Markos  -1.62 -0.68 0.90*** 
Dese  -1.66 -0.56 0.92*** 
Gondar  -1.69 -0.75 0.91*** 
Hosaena -1.42 -0.34 1.00*** 
Mek’ele  -1.64 -0.61 0.92*** 
Nazareth  -1.47 -0.43 0.98*** 
Nekemte -1.93 -0.87 0.88*** 
Shashemene -1.42 -0.37 0.99*** 
Woliso -1.69 -0.63 0.93*** 
Ziway -1.39 -0.35 0.99*** 
Jimma  -1.75 -0.81 0.86*** 
First difference (constant, no trend) 
Addis Ababa  -2.88* -2.83*** 0.072 
Ambo   -3.12** -3.14*** 0.069 
Bahir Dar   -3.08** -3.09*** 0.082 
Debre-Birhan  -2.95** -2.30** 0.046 
Debre-Markos  -2.81** -2.79*** 0.073 
Dese  -2.93** -2.91*** 0.074 
Gondar  -3.01** -3.03*** 0.076 
Hosaena -3.14** -2.66*** 0.061 
Mek’ele  -3.33** -3.32*** 0.074 
Nazareth -3.25** -3.07*** 0.084 
Nekemete -3.36** -3.17*** 0.055 
Shashemene -3.45** -3.35*** 0.058 
Woliso -3.35** -3.24*** 0.066 
Ziway  -2.93** -2.82*** 0.071 
Jimma  -3.08** -3.09*** 0.058 
Notes: ***, **, * reject the null hypothesis at 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % significance levels, respectively 
                                                          
3    The study used the Ethiopian Grain Trade Enterprise (EGTE) monthly wholesale maize price data. The 
dataset incorporates fifteen maize market locations in Ethiopia: central market (Addis Ababa Ehel-
Berenda market) and regional maize markets (Ambo, Bahir-Dar, Debre-Birhan, Dese, Debre-Markos, 
Gondar, Hosaena, Jimma, Mek’ele, Nazareth, Nekemete, Shashemene, Woliso, and Ziway). The price 
series is from July 2004 to March 2016 (141 months). 




Based on the information criterion (Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), and 
Hannan-Quinn Information Criterion (HQ)), the optimal lag length of the VAR in 
the surplus and deficit maize markets equations is selected as eight and three, 
respectively. Thus, supporting the rational and validity of the T-Y approach of 
Granger causality, as the true lag length of the model is greater than the order of 
integration. In the next stage, we augment the VAR by the maximum order of 
integration of the series and estimate VAR (9) and (4) for the surplus and deficit 
maize markets equations. However, estimating VAR (9) using 141 monthly 
observations caused an over-parameterization problem as the VAR with 9 lags and 
13 markets contain approximately 1534 parameter estimates. To address this 
problem, we used an alternative approach to estimate the price relationship 
analysis between the Addis Ababa and surplus regional maize markets. To do this, 
we treat the Addis Ababa maize market as the central market, and then define two 
concentric rings around Addis Ababa. That is, the first ring contains surplus maize 
markets within 200 km of Addis Ababa and considered as the near markets. On 
the other hand, the outer ring markets defined as the distant markets and includes 
all other surplus regional maize markets. The analysis further simplified by 
examining the average prices with each ring. A newly estimated three-variable-
VAR model addressed the over-parametrization problem.  
 
Tables 2 and 3 below present the results of T-Y modified Wald test of causality 
among deficit and surplus regional maize markets in Ethiopia. The findings from 
T-Y causality test indicate that the Addis Ababa maize market price movement 
influences surplus maize markets located around Addis Ababa. Likewise, the 
Addis Ababa maize market price dictates the maize price formation of all the 
deficit regional maize markets considered in this study. Therefore, the null 
hypothesis of no causality from the Addis Ababa maize price to the above-
mentioned surplus and deficit maize markets has been rejected. The direction of 
causation is bi-directional from the Addis Ababa maize market to the deficit Dese 
maize market and surplus regional maize markets situated near to Addis Ababa. 
However, distance surplus maize markets are only influenced by inner markets.  
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Table 2. T-Y causality test between Addis Ababa and deficit maize markets 


















Notes: Null hypothesis of non-causality: 𝜒2 (2) statistics    
Probability values in parentheses; ****, ** reject the null hypothesis at 1 % and 5 % significance levels 
 
Table 3. T-Y causality test between Addis Ababa and surplus maize markets 
 

















Notes: Inner ring markets include Ambo, Debre-Birhan, Nazareth, Woliso, and Ziway surplus maize markets, while the 
rest surplus regional maize markets are grouped under outer ring markets; null hypothesis of non-causality: 𝜒2 (2) 
statistics; probability values in parentheses; ****, ** reject the null hypothesis at 1 % and 5 % significance levels 
Long-run relationships 
A set of variables is defined as cointegrated if a linear combination of them is 
stationary (Brooks, 2008). Cointegrated variables may also be seen as constituting 
a long-term relationship or equilibrium relationship. This is because market forces, 
such as the arbitrage process among integrated markets, are expected to bring a 
price difference to an equilibrium position. Therefore, in cointegrated variables, a 
short-run deviation from a long-run equilibrium position is possible, but in the 
long term, arbitrage processes would restore the price difference to an equilibrium 
position. 
Since the price series is non-stationary and integrated of the same order, 
cointegration analysis is therefore appropriate to investigate the long-run relation 
among maize market prices. Given the large number of maize markets, 
cointegration tests are conducted in a pairwise fashion. Following the result of the 
T-Y causality test, the Addis Ababa maize market is treated as an exogenous 
maize market.
4
 Thus, in the subsequent cointegration and APT analysis, the 
                                                          
4    In the context of market integration analysis, a market price is exogenous if it does not respond to changes in other 
commodity market prices. This market is also called a dominant market. In this case, the price relationship between a 




regional wholesale maize markets are paired with the Addis Ababa maize market. 
The use of the Addis Ababa maize price as that of a central market is appropriate 




Cointegration among maize market pairs are tested using Johansen’s method 
(Johansen 1991). The results for the cointegrated maize market pairs are presented 
in Table 4 below. Trace and Maximal Eigenvalue test statistics provide no 
conflicting results. In both cases, the null of zero cointegrating vectors (r = 0) is 
rejected. However, the hypothesis of more than one cointegrating vector is 
rejected in both test statistics. The last column in Table 4 presents the lag length 
selected for long-run analysis of market pairs. Optimum lags were chosen using 
the information criterion (AIC, SBC, and Likelihood Ratio (LR)). 
Table 4. Johansen tests between cointegrated wholesale maize market pairs 
Markets Trace Ho Trace statistic Max Ho Max-Eigen statistic Lags 
Addis – Ambo 
  = 0 29.08***  =0 29.00*** 
2 
    0.075  =1 0.075 
Addis – BD* 
  = 0 23.81***  =0 20.09** 
2 
    3.72  =1 3.72 
Addis – DB* 
  = 0 19.74***  =0 19.64*** 
3 
    0.10  =1 0.10 
Addis – Dese 
  = 0 25.29***  =0 25.20*** 
2 
    0.09  =1 0.09 
Addis – Gondar 
  = 0 20.38***  =0 20.37*** 
2 
    0.008  =1 0.009 
Addis – Jimma 
  = 0 18.53***  =0 18.47*** 
9 
    0.06  =1 0.06 
Addis-Mek’ele 
  = 0 13.71**  =0 13.71** 
3 
    0.003  =1 0.003 
Addis-Nekemete 
  = 0 22.44**  =0 18.87** 
8 
    3.57  =1 3.57 
Addis – Woliso 
  = 0 35.06***  =0 34.91*** 
2 
    0.15  =1 0.15 
Addis – Ziway 
  = 0 27.01***  =0 26.87*** 
2 
    0.15  =1 0.15 
Notes: *BD and DB stand for Bahir Dar and Debre-Birhan markets, respectively5 
***, ** significance levels at 1 and 5 %, respectively 
                                                                                                                                                               
central and regional market will form a dominant–satellite price relationship. In the dominant market, price is 
determined outside of the system (group of markets) that is analysed. However, supply and demand shocks in this 
market feed through to other markets because of market linkage (Asche et al., 2012). 
5    Cointegration test specifications for maize market pairs are mixed. Some market pairs are estimated with no 
deterministic trend (no intercept and no trend), while other pairs are estimated with no deterministic trend (intercept 
and no trend).  
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Results from the Johansen cointegration tests show that no cointegration was 
found between Addis Ababa and the regional maize markets of Debre-Markos, 
Hosaena, Shashemene, and Nazareth market pairs. Given the proximity of 
Nazareth and Addis Ababa, the absence of cointegration between these two 
wholesale maize markets was not expected. The two markets are located within a 
radius of 86.5 km and are connected with good, all-weather roads. Therefore, 
transaction costs and costs for acquiring market information are expected to be 
low. This result may provide evidence that transportation costs and infrastructure 
facilities might not have that much influence on cointegration between these two 
adjacent markets. This remark is consistent with the finding of Getnet et al. (2005) 
of a low degree of market integration between the neighbouring Addis Ababa and 
Ambo markets (119 km). The presence of market segmentation between adjacent 
maize markets might be attributable to imperfect competition in the maize market 
structure, which further motivates us to investigate the phenomenon of APT in 
maize market structure in Ethiopia. 
 
Asymmetric Price Transmission 
In this section, we discuss the findings from AECM obtained by segmenting the 
speed of adjustment for previous year disequilibria into positive and negative 
components. Estimates of AECM for regional maize markets as dependent 
variables are presented in Table 5 below. The results from Table 5 show that the 
contemporaneous changes in coefficients are significant at 1 percent and less than 
one in all regional maize market equations. This implies that the regional 
wholesale maize markets do not respond fully within one month to the Addis 
Ababa wholesale price changes, and that monthly data is frequent enough for 
investigating the dynamics of maize price transmission. The results further 
demonstrate that out of 14 maize market pairs with the central Addis Ababa 
market, APT is confirmed in only two wholesale maize markets, those of Mek’ele 
and Nekemete. Contrary to our expectations, negative asymmetric price 
adjustment exhibits in both the Mek’ele and Nekemete wholesale maize markets. 
Since ECTt-1
+
 indicates that regional wholesale maize prices are higher than the 
central Addis Ababa price, i.e. the margin is higher, compared with the long-run 
equilibrium value. In these markets, therefore, wholesalers respond more rapidly 
when the margin is stretched than when it is squeezed. In the Mek’ele market, 
wholesalers do not correct the negative price difference from previous year 
disequilibria. Our AECM results are in line with the findings of Wondemu (2015) 
who found that there was no APT in the Dire-Dawa and Mek’ele maize market 




price adjustments to the central Addis Ababa wholesale maize market price 
shocks. 
 
Several factors may contribute to the absence of asymmetric price adjustment in 
wholesale maize market in Ethiopia. The active presence of the Ethiopian Grain 
Trade Enterprise (EGTE) in the maize market may contribute to symmetric price 
transmission in the maize market in Ethiopia. The EGTE is the only parastatal 
organization involving in the procurement of maize from farmers, for three 
purposes: the national food reserve, school feeding, and the Productive Safety Net 
Programme (PSNP). In addition to these activities, the enterprise is also involved 
in maize price stabilization. In response to a maize price plunge, EGTE procured 
18 000 tons from farmers, and exported about 11 000 tons of maize in 2002. 
 
 
Besides the EGTE, other non-governmental organizations such as the World Food 
Programme (WFP) are also involved in the maize market in Ethiopia. The recent 
launch of the Purchase for Progress Program (P4P) and purchase from Africans to 
African (PAA) programmes of the WFP ought to play an important role in maize 
price determination by linking producers to output markets. Both programmes 
have targeted local procurement of white maize commodity from farmers for 
humanitarian assistance to other neighbouring countries. From 2010 to 2013, the 
P4P of the WFP purchased 26 212 tons of maize and beans, generating nearly 
USD8 million for Ethiopian smallholders. Close to 600 000 maize farmers, 
excluding large-scale maize traders, have benefited from the programme (Nogales 
and Fonseca, 2014). In general, these initiatives may contribute to stiff 
competition in wholesale maize markets. Hence, the active participation of these 
organisations in the maize market is expected to improve the competitive structure 
of the maize market in Ethiopia. 
 
In summary, from the analysis of APT, we would conclude that asymmetric price 
adjustment has not contributed to the recent maize price surge in Ethiopia.  
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Table 5. Estimates of Asymmetric error correction for regional maize markets, July 2004 to March 2016 
Coefficients 
Regional maize markets (dependent variable) 
Nazareth Dese Jimma Ambo Mek’ele DM Ziway Shashemene Woliso Hosaena Nekemete DB BD Gondar 
Constant  -3.421 1.278 6.229 0.284 11.06** -2.907 0.748 -3.204 1.033 0.959 6.794* 1.153 2.167 2.612 
D(Addis) 0.782*** 0.764*** 0.936*** 0.659*** 0.626*** 0.641*** 0.630*** 0.668*** 0.785*** 0.569*** 0.469*** 0.752*** 0.375*** 0.381*** 
ECTt-1+ 0.069 -0.39*** -0.75*** -0.66*** -
0.542*** 
-0.161** -0.53*** -0.231** -0.63*** -0.717*** -0.709*** -0.42*** -0.30*** -
0.219*** 
ECTt-1- -0.249* -0.381** -0.423* -0.71*** 0.029 -
0.359*** 
-0.53*** -0.407*** -0.56*** -0.775*** -0.330** -0.43*** -0.275** -0.263** 
    
  -0.390*** -0.160 -0.028 0.120 -0.216** -0.103 0.353*** 0.253*** 0.207** -0.051     
    
  -0.320** 0.075 -0.077 -0.003 -
0.249*** 
0.142 -0.116 -0.218**       
    
  -0.499*** -0.072 -0.148 0.206**           
    
  -0.442*** -0.175 0.060 -0.055           
    
  -0.080 -0.140 0.004            
    
  -0.375*** 0.164 0.113            
    
      0.506*** 0.103 -0.078 -0.108 0.049 0.024 -0.091 -0.044 -0.181 0.142     
    
      0.386*** 0.013 -0.033 -0.090 0.232** 0.021 -0.022 0.088       
    
      0.313** 0.045 -0.022 -0.080           
    
      0.348*** 0.129 -0.041 -0.018           
    
      0.128 -0.098 -0.285            
    
      0.087 0.034 0.209            
Adj. R2 0.569 0.425 0.463 0.468 0.415 0.505 0.389 0.454 0.456 0.490 0.502 0.426 0.297 0.363 
LM test  0.279 0.246 0.249 0.516 0.290 0.113 0.881 0.379 0.254 0.221 0.718 0.556 0.803 0.599 
Wald test of 
HO: ECTt-1+= 
ECTt-1- 
2.700 0.003 0.139 0.069 7.173*** 1.754 0.0003 1.203 0.117 0.083 2.886* 0.0003 0.843 0.129 
Notes:     
  represents lag length of the dependent regional maize markets; Lag length is selected using AIC and SBC criteria; The Breusch-Godfrey (1978) (LM) test 
for higher-order serial correlation rejected the presence of autocorrelation in all equations. The values reported in the LM test are the probability values where the test 
failed to reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation in the individual maize equations;  
***, **, * denote rejection of the null hypothesis at 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % significance level, respectively. 
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Conclusion and Policy Implications 
 
By overlooking the important role of grain traders in providing marketing service 
to smallholder farmers and grain price stabilization, since 2008, policy makers 
have consistently blamed traders for persistence of soaring food prices in Ethiopia. 
This perception of policy decision makers have also shared by consumers. This 
resulted in a new policy in food market regulation and direct government 
intervention in commercial grain import for selected crops. This study empirically 
tested whether there exists price manipulations in the adjustment process of grain 
traders by taking the case of wholesale maize markets in Ethiopia. 
 
Despite the widely held belief by consumers and government that traders’ 
inappropriate price adjustment contributes to the persistence of soaring food prices 
in Ethiopia, we found no evidence to support this argument. Instead, wholesale 
maize traders’ tend to adjust homogenously to increase and decrease in maize 
price deviations from the central Addis Ababa maize market. Surprisingly, 
regional wholesale maize markets of Mek’ele and Nekemete adjust prices more 
quickly for decrease in prices stemming from the central Addis Ababa wholesale 
maize market than increase in prices. 
The active presence of the Ethiopian Grain Trade Enterprise and involvement of 
non-governmental organization such as the WFP in domestic maize market may 
contribute to the absence of asymmetric price adjustment in wholesale maize 
market in Ethiopia. The government state trading enterprise, the EGTE, 
intervention in the domestic maize market as a facilitator for maize market 
through occasional buying and selling in times of soaring food prices and bumper 
harvests is expected to improve the maize market structure. Furthermore, the 
involvement of other agencies such as the WFP in maize procurement from 
farmers has enabled farmers to organize themselves in group marketing. Group 
marketing can eliminate the possible exploitation of uninformed smallholder 
farmers by marketing intermediaries (Pokhrel and Thapa, 2007). We believe that 
these interventions have brought a healthy competition in wholesale maize market 
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